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(2013). Pp. 276. Hardcover $ 29.95.
The war power is perhaps the governmental power least amenable to constitutional
government. Constitutional government presupposes a limited government, which means
that certain objects are placed beyond the power of government itself; yet the power
presupposes that all such limits are secondary to the war itself. The designers of the
Constitution of 1787 attempted to surmount this problem by way of separation of powers
and by dividing the war power against itself. In Thomas Jefferson’s words, the
Constitution created a “check to the Dog of war, by transferring the power of letting him
loose from the executive to the Legislative body, from those who are to spend to those
who are to pay.”1 But as political scientists since Woodrow Wilson have documented,
there are consequences to separation of powers, and some of these consequences are not
so desirable with respect to the war power. In particular, the dividing of the war power
contributes to a lack of accountability and to gridlock. When the party of peace and the
party of war share control over the presidency, the House, and the Senate, the partisan
questions of war and peace become entangled with constitutional questions of authority.
The problem is this: because the Constitution creates, as Edward S. Corwin put it, an
“invitation to struggle” over foreign affairs, the Constitution itself exacerbates the tension
between constitutional government and the war power.2
In the United States, these kinds of tensions are not resolved by constitutional
conventions. In this, James Madison won the debate he had with his lifelong ally, Thomas
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2. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF
PRACTICE AND OPINION 171 (4th ed. 1957).
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Jefferson, who preferred to have a new constitutional convention for every generation—
or at least whenever a separation of powers crisis resulted in deep constitutional
confusion.3 Instead of conventions—or even formal amendments—most constitutional
change in the twentieth century has been accomplished by Supreme Court opinion.
Whether it is the commerce power or the non-delegation doctrine, the Equal Protection
Clause, or the right of privacy, the Constitution of 2015 is different than the Constitution
of 1787. This is true of the war power too. Today, it is widely held that presidents must
decide whether the country will start a war, yet, for early Americans, it was universally
held that only Congress had this power. This was a fundamental change, and, like the
others, it happened without a constitutional convention. However, unlike the others, it also
happened without a Supreme Court decision. In this, the change is even less “formal” than
the others.
This development makes for unusually awkward politics. Not only does separation
of powers contribute to partisan arguments about who holds the authority for war, but the
development of a “new understanding” of the war power also allows critics of the president
to claim the mantle of the original Constitution. Likewise, presidents benefit from the
presumption that they get to decide whether to wage war or not, but they lack a clear formal
change to the original constitution to justify what they take for granted. This uncertainty
about constitutional authority is further muddled when the claims shift according to control
of the presidency.
Over the last several decades, the most vocal defenders of congressional
prerogatives have been members of the political party that does not control the presidency.
If these crosscutting and ever changing claims that result are bad for politics, they are good
for scholarship in the sense that they offer much to be explained. There is always the
question of who really has the power under the Constitution. But on top of that, there is
the question of how did we get here? And there is the question, is the current practice good
for war and good for constitutional government? Does it work better than the old way? Or
would an alternative path be better than them both?
The four books under review confirm that the scholarship on the war power is still
vibrant even if the political debate on the war power has grown rather predictable. Of those
four, Stephen M. Griffin’s Long Wars and the Constitution and Mariah Zeisberg’s War
Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority are concerned with understanding the
authority for the war power. The other two, Andrew J. Polsky’s Elusive Victories: The
American Presidency at War and Fred I. Greenstein’s Presidents and the Dissolution of
the Union: Leadership Style from Polk to Lincoln, are more concerned with understanding
the basis for presidential success and failure. The first two seek to understand how the
Constitution works, while the second two seek to explain the secrets of executive
leadership.
In Long Wars and the Constitution, Tulane law professor Stephen Griffin argues that
there is a new constitutional order with respect to the war power. This new order began in
1945, under the administration of Harry S. Truman, and it has been continued by presidents
and Congresses of both parties to this day. In short, presidents since Truman have
consistently denied that “the Constitution require[s] authorization by Congress before the

3. JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS (1999).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss2/6

2

Bailey: It's the War Power, Again

2015]

IT’S THE WAR POWER, AGAIN

651

U.S. engages in war,” and they have consistently affirmed that “the Constitution grant[s]
the power to the president to initiate war independent of Congress.”4 This is, to be sure,
not a new argument, but Griffin aims to show that it is “more correct” than its original
defenders originally conceived.5 It is more correct because that constitutional order was
both made possible by an emergent US foreign policy and military capability, but it was
also required by that new foreign policy. 6
Before I turn to laying out this argument, I should note that Griffin never mentions
or cites Robert Scigliano’s 1998 argument that there is a new understanding of the war
power.7 Like Griffin, Scigliano points to the emergence and evolution of lists of military
actions that did not include congressional declarations,8 lists that were compiled and
disseminated by advocates of a new understanding that the president may take the country
from a state of peace to a state of war. And, like Griffin, Scigliano argues that this shift in
the new understanding was brought about by a new understanding in foreign policy,
specifically, one that casts the United States as the protector of peace loving nations. 9 Had
he come across Scigliano’s argument, Griffin might have had to wrestle with Scigliano’s
claim that the first such list actually happened not under Truman but, rather, in 1933 under
FDR.10 If correct, this would potentially muddle Griffin’s bright line, grouping FDR with
the presidents of the old constitutional order. However, if FDR were the founder of the
new way, then that would be a powerful precedent for the defenders of presidential war
powers.
Griffin argues that the new policy that demanded the new order was the doctrine of
containment, a policy that connected presidential administrations throughout the Cold
War. In Griffin’s analysis, it is this foreign policy that is key to understanding the change
in the understanding of constitutional authority. In his view, “we should analyze war
powers in terms of the fundamentals of foreign policy rather than occasional presidential
statements.”11 Importantly, the new view, started by Truman and continued by
Eisenhower, blurred the distinction between war and peace while it relied on a distinction
between nuclear and covert action on the one hand and conventional military authority on
the other.12 That is, while presidents and Congresses may have debated the extent to which
Congressional authority was necessary for the use of conventional authority, no one argued
that the Congress would have to authorize nuclear and covert actions. Nuclear and covert
actions were potentially necessary, because the nation was not actually at peace. Griffin’s
argument is compelling: complaining about the imperial presidency is not enough; rather,
we have to understand its foundation in historical development. 13
4.
5.
6.
7.

STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 34 (2013).
Id. at 32.
Id.
ROBERT SCIGLIANO, The New Understanding of the President’s War Power, in LIBERTY UNDER LAW:
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW 129, 129-46 (Kenneth L Grasso &
Cecilia Rodriguez Castillo, eds., 1998).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. GRIFFIN, supra note 4, at 99.
12. Readers familiar with Stephen F. Knott’s work will wonder why Griffin did not address Knott’s claim
that covert action has been important since the early republic. See STEPHEN F. KNOTT, SECRET AND SANCTIONED:
COVERT OPERATIONS AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (1996).
13. GRIFFIN, supra note 4, at 264-69.
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Griffin thus intends to explain how the constitutional order came about, and in this,
he explicitly rejects presidentialist alternatives. 14 First among these are the use of various
lists complied by administrations to show that historical precedents can provide guidance
even where the Constitution is unclear. Here, Griffin points to the various lists provided
by defenders of presidential war powers. He emphasizes one in particular, published in
1945 by former assistant secretary of state James Grafton Rogers. 15 Rogers “assembled a
list of 149 instances in which the U.S. had used armed force abroad” and “[o]f these, he
claimed at least 100 occurred solely on the basis of executive order without authorization
from Congress.”16 As Griffin points out, later presidentialists would employ updated
versions of this list in order to justify presidential control of the war power, but the problem
is that the foreign policy surrounding many of the events on the lists were “imperial[]”
adventures “in service of frankly racist ideas of white supremacy . . . .”17 In his view, it
would be inappropriate for presidents to point to precedents for constitutional guidance if
the foreign policy behind the precedent was not especially praiseworthy. 18 I am not sure
this is altogether persuasive as a matter of constitutional authority, but it is perceptive with
respect to the potential political awkwardness for claims of presidential authority.
He also dismisses John Yoo’s alternative argument. 19 For Yoo, there is no need for
talk about a new constitutional order, because the Constitution of 1787 is more than
sufficient for modern war. 20 In Yoo’s view (and to my knowledge, Yoo was the first to
make this argument): confusion over the war power can be traced to a misreading of the
“declare war” clause.21 Specifically, that clause should be read as giving Congress the
power to recognize that war exists, and should not be read as giving Congress the authority
to decide whether there would be war or not. 22 Yoo cleverly points out that the framers
could have easily used a word for authorize, but they did not. 23 And, in the minds of the
Framers, declarations were closer to parchment barriers, so the real power to limit war
came in the form of Congress power over the purse. So, for Yoo, the Framers’ choice to
say “declare war” rather than “authorize war” was an important one and can relieve the
disjunction between modern practice and original text. 24
One problem with Yoo’s account is that there is no real evidence that any early
American—not even Alexander Hamilton—actually believed it. As Griffin puts it, “the
most serious problem with Yoo’s argument is that he is unable to find a single person in
the Convention or ratification debates who advocated the kind of presidential warinitiation power he favors.”25 Yoo does not see that as a problem because, according to his
understanding of originalist methodology, statements by early Americans amount to little

14. Id.
15. Id. at 81.
16. Id. at 82.
17. Id. at 83.
18. Id. at 84.
19. Id. at 269.
20. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11
(2005).
21. Id. at 144-52.
22. Id. at 145.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 149.
25. GRIFFIN, supra note 4, at 45.
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more than mere intellectual history. 26 As Griffin notes, in Yoo’s view, the surer approach
is understanding the movement from British and colonial practice to the text of the
Constitution itself.27 As a result, Yoo’s focus on “original understanding” rather than
subsequent practice allows Yoo to understate the importance of the shift that happened
after World War II. For Griffin, the important point is that there was continuity from 1787
through 1945, and that continuity rested on the assumption that only Congress may
authorize war. “Far from being a ‘formality,’ there was an awareness of the constitutional
rule as establishing a framework for decisionmaking that governed how the nation went to
war.”28
Griffin’s point about the assumption that there was a shared understanding about a
process for decision-making serves as the foundation for the second half of his argument.
Not only is there a new constitutional order in his view, this constitutional order is deeply
flawed in that in was never well thought out. Since it was not well thought out, it has
“destabilized the constitutional system and deranged policymaking.”29 In particular, and
as the Vietnam War demonstrated, the new order lacked the ability to “generate the public
support for the kind of military action implied by the premise of that order.”30 That is, for
Griffin, the problem was not so much that Kennedy and LBJ never explained the objective
in Vietnam; rather, the problem was that they were not forced to. Likewise, Griffin traces
George H. W. Bush’s reelection difficulties to Bush’s unwillingness to engage in “an
adequate round of interbranch deliberation,”31 which resulted in his not having forged a
“lasting meaning” for the war against Iraq, which, in turn, meant that he could not
campaign on its limited victory. 32
This point about deliberation is at the heart of Michigan political theorist Mariah
Zeisberg’s award winning book War Powers. She also seeks to revise our understanding
of the historical practice of war powers; however, her main objective is to clarify the way
we evaluate arguments made about war powers. 33 That is, Zeisburg not only wants more
deliberation in constitutional politics, she aims to show readers to how to distinguish good
deliberation from the bad. She does not seek to explain political behavior as much she
seeks to engage in normative defense or criticism of that behavior. Her primary goal is to
show readers how to assess the authoritativeness of a constitutional claim made during
deliberation.
Zeisberg’s most interesting and controversial claim is that the Constitution does not
have a precise meaning with respect to the war power. 34 She disagrees with both Yoo and
his critics who intend to proclaim whether the president or the Congress ultimately has
“the” authority under the Constitution. 35 These accounts, which she labels “settlement
theory,” fail to recognize the indeterminacy of the Constitution with respect to the war

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

YOO, supra note 20, at 28-29.
GRIFFIN, supra note 4, at 41-45.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 179.
MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY (2013).
Id. at 41-53.
Id.
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power, and in their place, she proposes a “relational” account.36 By this relational account,
the Constitution structures debates and processes about authority in a way that does not
determine the outcome. This does not mean that anything goes. Rather, following work
done in the growing literature on departmentalism, it means that there are good and bad
arguments under the Constitution. In her words, “[t]he relational conception . . . asks us to
engage a set of decidedly political and contextual questions about institutional
performance in developing meaning for constitutional vocabulary.”37
The implication is that what matters is not whether Congress has voted to authorize
war, but rather whether deliberation about the war is done the proper way and for the right
reason. What is important, then, is the quality of the deliberation, not the presence of
agreement.38 This means, for Zeisberg, that it is possible that Congress authorizes war
incorrectly, such as when, as in the case of the Mexican War, congressional deliberation
has been subverted by executive secrecy. Likewise, presidents may act without Congress
if they do so by using the constitutional resources of the presidency and the “distinctive
governing capacities of the executive branch.”39 Thus, Zeisberg’s relational approach can
do what “common intuition” can do but settlement theory cannot: praise Kennedy’s
handling of the Cuban missile crisis yet condemn Nixon’s expansion of the war into
Cambodia.40 Likewise, Zeisberg credits the Congress that was complicit in creating the
very constitutional order Griffin criticizes: “legislative participation in the construction of
the Cold War security order was authoritative because the legislature combined strong
support and a consensus politics with developed criticism from a wide spectrum of policy
and constitutional positions.”41
Zeisberg thus intends to offer a normative methodology for assessing
authoritativeness that can enable constitutional scholars to move beyond the
insurmountable paradoxes caused by the dominant settlement approaches. Why is it, for
example, that Congress’s authorization of force in 2002 remains so unsatisfactory for
thinking about the authority to invade Iraq in 2003? In place of positivist accounts of
whether or not Congress legally authorized a conflict, “[t]his method enables a normative
analysis of constitutional politics in light of constitutional ideals.”42 To Zeisberg’s credit,
she does not back down from the implications of this novel argument. As she herself
claims, her relational theory aims to substitute unsettlement for settlement and thus is
directly antithetical to the judicial presumption that precedent matters. 43 In place of
“precedent-based reasoning,” the “relational conception prioritizes good judgment in the
particular context over and above consistency across cases.”44 In this, she is inspired by
Robert Jackson’s famous typology in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,45 but she
moves beyond it and improves it. Whereas Jackson wanted to find agreement between the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 222-24.
Id. at 251.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952).
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political branches,46 Zeisberg wants to know if that agreement is properly authoritative.47
In my view, Zeisberg’s ambitious account offers a potentially exciting first step
toward rethinking the war power, but it is not a successful one. The problem is that she
makes the same mistake she ascribes to proponents of settlement theory in that she assumes
that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed with respect to “distinctive institutional
capacities” of Congress and the president. 48 As a cursory reading of scholarship in
American Political Development reveals, these institutional capacities are far from fixed.
Indeed, they are the often changed by the very controversies that they are supposed to
solve. For example, at some point presidents began making the claim that they are
“representative” of the people and even that they are more representative than Congress.49
Likewise, the ability of presidents to gather information by way of the executive apparatus
has changed over time, moving from being tethered to partisan politics to becoming more
administrative in nature.50 More precisely, her argument strangely fails to see that what is
constitutionally distinctive is likely to be different from Polk to FDR to Reagan. Although
Zeisberg wishes to liberate war powers from settled theories of the meaning of the
Constitution, her argument nonetheless judges constitutional actors by how they act
according to a rather “determinate” and flat script.
If the first two books are about the authority to make war, the next two are more
about the extent to which presidents are good at it. Put somewhat differently, if the first
two books can be seen as part of the formalist school of Edward S. Corwin, the next two
are better classified as belonging to the informal approach associated with Richard
Neustadt.51 The latter are more interested in success and leadership than in the
Constitution.
Fred I. Greenstein’s slender Presidents and the Dissolution of the Union includes
Neustadt in its dedication, and its explicit focus is the leadership style of the presidents
from Polk to Lincoln. 52 Using secondary literature, Greenstein evaluates each president
according to the following skills: public communication, organization capacity, political
skill, policy vision, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence. 53 Readers puzzled by the
last category will note that the book is also dedicated to James David Barber. Greenstein
also aims to determine if the presidency mattered, particularly in the events leading to the
Civil War.54 Pointing to Michael Louis Beck’s “funnel of causality,” 55 Greenstein
concludes that the presidency did matter: “the men who occupied the White House in the
Civil War era and what they did while there made a difference.”56 Very little of this little
46. ZEISBERG, supra note 33, at 253-61.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 185.
49. For a discussion of the literature on this subject, see Jeremy D. Bailey, Opposition to the Theory of
Presidential Representation: Federalists, Whigs, and Democrats, in PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY NO.
44, 50-71 (2014).
50. SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL (1993).
51. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF
LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (1990).
52. FRED I. GREENSTEIN, PRESIDENTS AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION (2013).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 11.
55. Id. at 124.
56. Id. at 123.
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book will be of interest for specialists, but it is a useful and quick summary for those
unfamiliar with the period.
Andrew J. Polsky’s hefty Elusive Victories is worth the attention of non-specialists
and specialists alike. According to the author, the book was originally conceived as a
“liberal lament” on “the excesses of executive authority,” but it instead became a book
about the limits of presidential power.57 In short, although presidents are very successful
in taking the country to war, they often fall far short of their goals. So, for Polsky, the most
important puzzle is not who has the authority to take the country to war, or even why
Congress gave that power away.58 Rather, what cries out for explanation is why victory
remained elusive for so many presidents. If starting a war is so easy, why is winning it so
hard? Polsky breaks this question into several further inquiries. First, why is it that the
separation of powers has failed in curtailing presidential war power? Second, why does
the commander-in-chief so often “struggle to find an effective approach to achieve the
national objectives they have established . . . ?”59 Third, why do presidents often fail to
plan for the aftermath of war? Fourth, why do wartime presidents fail with respect to their
domestic agenda? Fifth, “why do presidents find themselves bereft of strategic options,”
even and especially when fighting wars against weaker enemies”?60
To solve these puzzles, Polsky examines the presidencies of Lincoln, Wilson, FDR,
Johnson, Nixon, George W. Bush, and Obama—though the latter examination is
necessarily short. The case studies reveal that there is sometimes no single set of best
practices for wartime presidents.61 Consider the question of managing the military effort
itself: should the president be hands-on or hands-off? Unsuccessful presidents such as
Johnson were hands-on, but so were the more successful presidents such as Lincoln (at
least until he found Grant) and FDR. Consider also the puzzle of securing the peace.
Lincoln failed to articulate a post war vision (and even “failed to seize the moment” when
offered).62 Thus, Reconstruction was in some sense doomed from the start. By contrast,
Wilson was very clear in his post war plan for peace, but the ambition of the plan sparked
opposition to wartime and domestic policies.
The answer that emerges in Polsky’s account owes more to Stephen Skowronek than
it does to Neustadt.63 Presidents will not be more likely to succeed if given better or more
resources; thus, the problem is not one of persuasion or command. “No increase in the size
of the military, no new weapons system, no assertion of a new executive prerogative can
alter the wartime power paradox. It boils down to this: the kind of power that presidents
command does nothing to preserve their freedom of action over time.” 64 This is to say,
then, that “[i]n war, time is a president’s true enemy,” because presidents inevitably find
that one decision inevitably narrows the range of action for later decisions.65 Every choice

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

ANDREW J. POLSKY, ELUSIVE VICTORIES: THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY AT WAR 363 (2012).
Id. at 6-11.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 72.
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE
BUSH (1993).
64. POLSKY, supra note 57, at 352.
65. Id.
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comes at a consequence and reversing course becomes more and more difficult. The
successful wartime president, therefore, is torn between preserving freedom of action and
the imperatives of articulating the objectives of war and peace. On top of this, freedom of
action is narrowed by political development. For example, Lincoln and Wilson were able
to curtail the expression of dissent in way that more recent presidents could not. These
points seem to be a compelling and a much needed corrective to the aphorisms of wartime
presidential leadership we often see in textbooks.
Polsky’s book is impressive, if only for his attempt to accomplish what most
presidency scholars are unwilling to try. Namely, whereas most presidency scholars do
scrutinize the actual military tactics of wartime presidencies, Polsky confidently assesses
the military judgment of the presidents in his case studies. This clearly required a great
deal of work, and likely a lot of self-education on Polsky’s part. To be clear, this goes well
beyond the competence of this reader. From the footnotes, it appears that Polsky has relied
on—and weighed—the judgments of leading military historians, so readers more familiar
with these accounts will find much to glean from Polsky’s analysis of presidential
decision-making.
This reader noticed one error worth mentioning. In his discussion of Lincoln and
prerogative, Polsky writes that Lincoln admitted in his special message of 1861 that his
measures in that summer violated the letter of the Constitution.66 Lincoln did no such thing
in that speech. More broadly, Polsky’s account of Lincoln and prerogative relies on the
histories by David Donald and James McPherson and lacks the subtlety of the more
recent—and very large—literature on Lincoln and the Constitution, which he strangely
omits (see, for example, the work of Benjamin Kleinerman).67 This led me to wonder if
Polsky over relied on the military historians in the other case studies, but I leave that to
other readers to determine.
Although Polsky does not himself make this connection, his book forces us to ask if
we really want the kind of deliberation Zeisberg, and in some sense, Griffin recommend.
If wartime success is ultimately a matter of preserving freedom of action, the problem
might be that deliberation is one of those parts of constitutional politics that narrows and
limits presidential decision-making. To be sure, all four authors note that more deliberation
would better serve presidents in terms of clarifying the objective and in terms of preparing
for the post-war peace, but Polsky’s account also reminds us that the objectives of war and
peace remain in flux, that the reasons for war and the strategies for preserving the peace
are likely to change over time.
Zeisberg might respond that these changes can be addressed in deliberation arising
from the respective qualities of the two branches. And, somewhat paradoxically, she may
have accurately cobbled together the best statement of the original understanding of the
contested war power. Even if she has, we still need to ask if the original understanding of
constitutional design can help us understand how presidents and members of Congress
understand themselves. Indeed, answering this question requires still more work about the
Constitution and Founders of 1787, but it also requires more work on the founders who
have changed the Constitution over time.
66. Id. at 33.
67. BENJAMIN A. KLEINERMAN, THE DISCRETIONARY PRESIDENT: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF EXECUTIVE
POWER (2009).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 50 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 6

658

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol50/iss2/6

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:649

10

